Counterfactual part 4

 Counterfactual part 4: This is a continuation of the post of a while back. The questions were

1. What might have conventional combat in Europe at this time (1964-1975 basically Vietnam Era+Yom Kippur war) looked like?
2. If the war escalates to nuclear exchanges what are we looking at?

I think for the second question I'm going to assume an attack coming out of interactions resulting from the Yom Kippur war.  For the first part I'm leaning  strongly on this document Assessing the Conventional Forces Balance in Europe, 1945-1975 in particular Chapters 4 and 5.

Looking at conventional forces near the end of this period there were really two schools of thought. The Optimists including the then  Secretary of Defense (Schlesinger) and many of the analysts held that the qualitative advantages (better aviation hardware and doctrine, better anti tank defense, the preliminaries versions of "smart" weapons) combined with the natural advantages of defense would provide the NATO forces with a mild to moderate advantage which should let them stop an assault by the Warsaw pact. The Pessimists including the Joint Chiefs of Staff, as well as many of the NATO military leaders felt that to steal a phrase "Quantity had a Quality all of its own". 4-5 US divisions had been diverted to Vietnam in the late 60's/ early 70's.  The Soviets had been increasing their numbers strongly, NATO's technological gap was slowly being eroded as things like the T-72 and newer aircraft came online. In addition the Warsaw Pact had superior material (armored troop carriers) and doctrine for combined arms operations. It should be noted that MUCH of the increase in the Soviet Army was actually deployed on the Sino-Soviet front as China was no longer a reliable ally. That said they did maintain the levels of the western forces, itself a feat. There was a clear advantage in numbers of divisions, however many of those (about a 1/3) were other Warsaw pact armies which might be needed to suppress/control their own populations. Also many of the Soviet and Warsaw Pact divisions would need additional manpower and materiel to be full strength and that mobilization would make obvious the intent giving NATO a fairly long lead time to prepare. 

I tend to favor the JCS (the pessimists). Much of  what the Optimists were depending upon was proving to be less effective than might be desired in Vietnam (although down the road that technological advantage grows). Also at this point the JCS brass are still Korean War and WWII veterans and are realists in their view of combat as well as command and control in that situation. Over the whole period the Soviet conventional strength grows so the later the war starts the worse for the NATO forces. A final issue is that throughout the period the Nuclear forces are moving closer to parity. This means the threat of nuclear response/retaliation to prevent an attack becomes far less viable than it had been in the '50s or early 60's. These factors  combined with moderate conventional superiority might also embolden the USSR. However even given the slight advantage it is not clear there is any advantage making a grab in the European front. The USSR is also tussling at the margins with their one time ally of China. Korea and Japan might be tempting, but both are hard nuts to crack. So we sit with the tit for tat border wars in Southeast Asia and Africa and sabre rattling in the Mideast. I think unless the Soviets could see a clear quick victory they knew this would quickly degrade into a war of attrition for which they had the materiel but without a clear need no real intent to carry through.

The nuclear front seems less clear. The most likely source of an exchange seems to be from the period of the Yom Kippur war in early October of 1973. With surprise and some new technical advances (TOW missiles, better quality SAM air defense) Egypt and Syria's attacks start making progress against the Israeli forces. About 3 days into the war Prime Minister Meir is thought to have put the (limited) Israeli nuclear forces on alert (see here ). US forces went to DEFCON 3 later in the month near the end of the conflict on October 25th. This was apparently due to some faulty technical data combined with a Soviet transport ship approaching Egypt. It was at the time thought to contain nuclear weapons although later information (perhaps from post the Soviet collapse?)  has revealed it did not. This jump to DEFCON 3 is thought to have been a signal to the Soviet government (see this article here note: this is paywalled you'll have to sign up for a free account that will let you have 100 reads a month) that their further intervention in the conflict interfering with ongoing peace talks was not to be tolerated. I think things are most likely to have gone bad near the start if instead of Israel getting control of the situation things had continued to degrade. If Israel felt it was going to be "pushed into the sea" they would use every tool at their command. Their leadership still had people who remembered and had been alive during the Holocaust and that would weigh heavily on their sense of duty.  They likely would have, like Samson, taken the temple down with them to save what they could of their people.With the nuclear genie loose in the middle east the Soviets might have felt a need to restrain the US/Nato forces from intervening against their allies and that could have escalated. 

Time wise this is after SALT I but that has little effect as it only locks forces numbers in place and includes the ABM treaty. Looking first at US forces (always easier) the 1973 DOD AR has a nice description of the forces at page 67 of that document

No major changes in deployed U.S. strategic retaliatory forces will be evident in FY 1973, although we are continuing to make qualitative improvements in our forces. At the end of that fiscal year, our strategic offensive force levels will continue to include 1,000 MINUTEMAN missiles, 54 TITAN missiles, 455 B-52 aircraft (26 squadrons), 72 FE-Ill aircraft (four squadrons), and 656 POLARIS and POSEIDON missiles carried in 41 nuclear submarines. In the strategic defensive forces, we will reduce to 585 manned interceptors and 755 surface-to-air missiles on site, together with associated warning and command and control systems.

I think the Minuteman missiles are primarily Minuteman II transitioning to Minuteman III. The Minuteman II had a single W56 warhead with ~1/2 MT yield and 1600m CEP. The Minuteman III had a 3 warhead MIRV bus with three W62 warheads with a yield of 170KT and a CEP of ~240M. What the split is is not obvious, The Minuteman III were being deployed starting in 1970 however there were Minuteman II missiles in operation until 1992. Assuming a 80/20 split on the II/III that yields 800 W56 warheads and 600 W62 warheads. The Minuteman II are most likely for countervalue strikes (cities, manufacturing and softer military sites). The Minuteman III have moved clearly into the realm of counterforce capability even with their smaller warhead their 480m CEP seems like enough to get likely kills on a silo. These are some of the most dependable missiles ever built, and the warheads are also well understood, and SAC is pretty near its peak so maybe 85-90% success rate.

The Titan missiles are Titan II missiles in hardened silos unlike the Titan I of the last post. They still carry the 9 MT W53 warheads. These are plain and simple countervalue weapons. I leave my 80% success rate from the last time.

Looking at the bomber forces there is a question of how many of those 455 B-52 were actually on nuclear alert. B-52D and G (in particular the G without ECM hardware) had been part of Rolling Thunder in 1972 estimates are as high as 80 were in use for that and ultimately over the Vietnam War ~30 were lost or destroyed. Assuming deployment in squadrons 30 squadrons of 12 yields 360 which seems possible. Looking at this List of B-52 units  I count over 40 squadrons active in 1973 (by looking at deactivation dates of bomber wings). 40 would be 480 B-52 so over the 455 the DOD AR has. Given that I'm just going take the 455 number as the best I can get. They can be equipped with SRAM missiles with 100 mile standoff range and 170 KT warheads. They can carry one of three different free fall weapons, the B-41 a either  25 MT dirty monster or a 10MT clean version, the B-53 the free fall version of the Titans W-53 with a 9 MT yield or the B61 with a settable yield up to 400Kt. The B-61 is small enough I'd think they could carry several, not sure about the others especially the B-41. Given the B-41 was designed for a high altitude drop I doubt it would have been loaded as low level attack had been the standard since the early '60s. It's hard to tell how effective the B-52 would have been. Certainly the Anti Air defenses of the Soviet Union were perhaps some of the best in the world. That said the Bombers aren't going to arrive until well after the missiles have come in and things like air defense and PVO bases would be high on their targeting list. Add to that the ability to suppress anything that even vaguely looks aggressive with 170 KT SRAM missiles and hordes of EW and maybe their odds of getting through are better than in the 1962 timeframe? To some degree the bombers are almost irrelevant, just piling on. But you can't hold the bombers for later they're exposed so they're use it or lose it to the Soviet missile strike. 

I suspect the FB-111 will just be used to prepare the way for the B-52s and to attack IRBM and SRBM sites in Europe. They're quick and agile but short ranged and potentially vulnerable  to AA as seen later when used in the conventional role vs Libya in the '80s.

This leaves us with the SSBN. There were 41 of them. The first 10 were Polaris only (Washington and Ethan Allen classes) and likely using Polaris A3 missiles at this point. The other 31 had larger tubes and could fit the Poseidon but the Poseidon had only been being fitted for a little over 2 years by October 1973 How many switched to Poseidon by that point isn't clear, but I suspect the changes were quick as by late 70's they're switching to Trident C4 missiles. I'm going to assume about 1/2 had made the transition so say 15. There are 16 missiles per sub so 416 Polaris A3 each with 3 MRV(not independently targetable) W-58 warheads  at 170 KT each for a total of 1248 warheads. And we have 240 Poseidon missiles with either 10 or 14 W-68 MIRV warheads. I'll assume the 10 configuration as it gives better range so 2400 40KT warheads. I'd say an 80% success rate seems feasible. The Polaris are probably for soft targets only, the Poseidons are more accurate but not quite as good as the Minuteman III and the smaller warhead means less ability to take out hardened targets. The SSBN force (known as 41 for Freedom) has one prime purpose, a retaliatory strike should a Soviet first strike debilitate the land forces.

At this point if your head is not spinning from the numbers here is a quick recap to make it worse. A land based launch of 1054 missiles with 1454 warheads. The SLBMs add another 656 sub launched missiles and 3648 warheads. That's a total of 5102 possible warheads. Splitting the difference on my success rates and averaging 85% that yields 4337 (rounded up) hits on Soviet (and potentially Warsaw pact) targets all of this arrives within a period of less than 1 Hour. Moscow does have the A35 Anti missile system permitted under the ABM treaty protecting it, but that is only 64 missiles. A barrage from a single Polaris A3 equipped sub could easily overwhelm this and not appreciably reduce the forces available for the rest of the USSR. The 455 strong bomber force is effectively irrelevant arriving 6-8 hours later (if at all) and simply making the radioactive debris bounce.

These numbers are so ludicrous, so insane as almost to make one laugh, except you realize that this probably effectively leaves no more than 10-15% of the Soviet population alive after prompt deaths and a month or two of other casualties. The USSR alleges to have had 280 million population plus in 1970. That seems somewhere between highly unlikely and out and out nonsense. US 1970 census showed 205 million and we had been breeding like rabbits through the 50's into the early 60's and didn't lose 1/3 to 1/2 our male breeding age population 30 years prior. I MIGHT buy 190 Million, World Bank qutes 132 Million. That said that strike would kill somewhere between 238 million (upper bound) and 118 Million (lower bound). that's an appalling figure in either case.

The US is NOT going to fare too much better. In the 1962 Missile Crisis scenario the Soviet's have few missiles and their SSBN are of VERY limited range. Their bombers are effectively suicide missions. All of this limits/blunts the results.  Much of that has changed in 11 years. The first  data I found is the Nuclear Weapons Databook from FAS. It has Table 2 on page 21 which is gross numbers of ICBM, SLBM and bombers for 1956 to 1996. Also interesting is the Intentions and capabilities Document of Estimates created by the CIA historians that contains a mass of declassified documents  from 1950 to 1983.  Two particular documents are of special interest the 1971 estimate NIE-11-8-69 (starting at page 253) which unfortunately seems incomplete (redaction?) and the NIE 11-8-70 (starting on page 263). The Databook has 1462 ICBM with 1557 warheads, 595 SLBM with 556 (sic?) warheads and 157 bombers with 568 weapons. Trying to figure out what the mix of these is is harder. 

The only bombers with range for the US are likely Bears.(TU-95), Badgers (TU-16) could reach Europe and Japan with a 1600 NM range (and refuel or one way mission) but not much else. Like the US bomber force they will arrive many hours after the initial attack. Note a time on target attack coordinated with the ICBM would likely NOT work as any surprise would be quickly lost as the DEW line and later OTH radars would see the bombers long before they would be in range of anything. Here I think the Bears arriving after the ballistic portion of the attack actually makes there likelihood to arrive on target far better than in the Cuban Missile Crisis scenario. Still their relevance is pretty limited, likely focusing on targets where the missiles missed their target or failed. This is again mostly a case in general of making the radioactive rubble bounce.

The ICBMs are FAR more numerous than the 30-40 in the 1962 scenario. There is also some MIRV/MRV going on as there are about 100 more warheads than missiles. The Nuclear Weapons Databook has some very good tables, in particular Table 4 on page 18 (I wish I'd found this earlier). In 1973 it lists the following ICBM's for the Soviets (Providing NATO nomenclature first details from wikipedia)

• 190 SS-7 (R-16) with either 3 or 6 MT warheads. only about 70 of these were in silos Their Hypergolic fuel took 1-3 hours to load and could only remain loaded for a few (2-3?) days before they would have to be defueled and sent for rework
• 19 SS-8 (R-9) These are IRBM with a maximum range of 6000KM with as ~2 MT warhead. These were in silos and have a 30 minute launch window. I think for attacks on the CONUS these can be ignored, they'll likely be used against European/British targets
•  238 SS-9 (R-36) In three variants most with 20MT warhead. These were in silos and use a bipropellant so probably similar to the SS-8/US Titan II in response time
• 905 SS-11 (UR-100) in 3 variants all with 1 MT warheads. Again a Bipropellant system housed in hardened silos 
• 60 SS-13 (RT-1) each with a 500KT warhead. These are the USSR's first solid propellent ICBM similar in concept to the US Minuteman
  

In total that is 1393 ICBM of which all but 120 are in silos. The numbers I get this way are in rough agreement with what I can glean from the period NIE. The total yield is MUCH higher than the similar US force likely because the CEP of these systems very poor (1 Mile/1300M is about the best reported) so with a larger warhead it is more likely to destroy its target

The SSB/SSBN fleet consists of 50 boats using four missile variants (per Table 6 in the Nuclear Weapons Databook)

• 21 SS-N-4 (R-13). These are VERY old missiles with short (~300NM ) range and the launchers have to surface to launch. I am going to ignore these, they'd be unlikely to succeed in a launch against CONUS and really can only hit coastal cities. These will likely be used against bases Like in the Philipines or the Indian ocean.
• 60 SS-N-5 (R-21). 800 KT warhead ~700 NM range. Still only coastal targets but at least they don't have to surface to launch
• 480 SS-N-6 (R-27) 1 MT warhead or 3 200KT MRV. Range is ~1200-1300 NM so similar to early US Polaris
• 34 SS-N-8 (R-29) Warhead unclear. Range ~4000 NM. It is NOT clear that these are actually operational at this time some sources claim 1974 for initial operational capability. I suspect given the massive overkill we can ignore them

So a total of 540 missiles in the roughly 1 MT range from the SSBN/SSB fleet. Total weapons 1833 (give or take the 120 not in silos) Call it 1700 with maybe 75% effective success so 1,275 total warheads almost all in the 1 Megaton+ range. I think that's 2-3 weapons for every population center over 50K  plus a couple for every airbase and sub base. In general I would expect this is a counter value strike, the CEP on these weapons is not good enough for weapons in silos, and the US SLBM fleet is large enough that even IF you take out the land based missiles the retaliatory strike ends the USSR. Similarly the 480 SS-N-6 mean that the US can not first strike without fairly heavy damage. This is truly the age of MAD. Likely full strikes will yield at least some environmental effects likely a "Nuclear Winter" as almost every city in the US, USSR, most of Europe and likely Japan will be burning. I don't think this is the end of humankind, but most of the Northern Hemisphere is reduced to pre 1800 technology, and the remaining countries will have neither the NATO nor Warsaw countries to trade with. I suspect few few bombs will hit Africa or India or other unaligned countries but their dependency on western food sources is going to make famine common especially if there is a Nuclear Winter effect.   Again like in the USSR the effect on the US is appalling with 10% survival feeling almost overly optimistic so something on the order of 190 million dead. I can't see either party being anything useful again for 50-100 years, it seems like it would take 2 generations to get back to  1800's technology and much would have to come from whatever survives of the unaligned nations.

Tregonsee (L2) signing out for now

Counterfactual part 3 USSR/USA Conflict in the early 1960's

  So this is part 3 of the post of a while back. The questions were

1. What might have combat in Europe at this time (Bay of Pigs/ Berlin Crisis/Cuban Missile Crisis) looked like?
2. If the war escalates to nuclear exchanges what are we looking at?

The first is at some level both hard to handle and easy to handle. In the hard part I find little to nothing on US/NATO or Soviet/Warsaw Pact orders of battle in easily accessed (i.e. internet) form. As my access to scholarly libraries is very limited (read none) and my time to pour through such works even more limited I will have to make do with limited resources. The easy part is strategy from that period is clear. For mid 1950's the strategy was that NATO conventional forces as a trip wire to warn about the oncoming Soviet forces and delay them until strategic nuclear forces could be brought into play to affect the situation   . This document has a fair outline of the NATO strategies from 1949-1969. There was a shift under way to a more flexible response starting in about 1957 (see pg. 22-24 of that document) but it was  not complete as the Kennedy administration took over in January of 1961. Kennedy and his various advisors (Particularly Macnamara) were adamant about having other options both nuclear (but more limited than all out nuclear war) and using only conventional forces. These were only under development when the Berlin crisis unfolded and were still not complete as of the Cuban Missile Crisis. So effectively the US policy was still tripwire/massive retaliation throughout this period. For the Berlin Crisis the Soviets might have considered striking or more likely would have stumbled into a response by some misinterpretation of NATO operations. For Bay of Pigs if the US had started to defeat Cuba the Soviets might have used an attack out of East Germany as a counter. Honestly they seemed to understand the NATO position and given their very limited strategic forces at that point I think they would have written Castro off at that point. The Missile crisis really was more a naval operation due to the blockade. Given period weapons thing might have quickly moved from conventional to tactical nuclear weapons (Nuclear tipped torpedos against US battle groups, nuclear ASROC by US against Soviet subs). Given US policy at that time to treat any nuclear weapon used against US forces as an attack upon US soil this likely would have degraded quickly to a nuclear exchange.

The materials on the nuclear side of the question are more definitive for at least the US side. A precis describing the history of the SIOP-63 (Strategic Integrated Operating Plan 1963) is available. SIOP-63 was literally the outline for the US war plan and was what was in operation in September of 1962 at the time of the Cuban Missile crisis. Unfortunately the plan itself seems still classified some 60+ years later. SIOP-62 is allegedly declassified, but I'm not having luck finding it online. What I did find is this excellent Nuclear Order Of Battle (NOB)by Robert Norris. This is one of the best of this kind of things I've seen for any period. This also provides a nice overview of US strategic nuclear policy throughout the period. 

I'm going to use what the USSR could have done in a nuclear response to the Cuban missile crisis as the worst case. As the Berlin Crisis and the Bay of Pigs were earlier the Soviet assets would have been fewer and would have been minus the Cuban assets. First let's look at strategic assets that can reach the US.  The NOB document says 6-8 SS-4 missiles with ~1200 mile (statute I believe) range were available in Cuba each with a 1 Megaton  weapon. There are a further 36 SS-7 missiles available each with either a 3MT warhead (13000 NM range) or a 5-6MT warhead (11,000) range. Of the SS-7 only 10 are in hardened silos so they are heavily "use it or lose it" Readying time is ~1/2 hour for the siloed weapons 3+ hours for the exposed ones. The Cuban weapons were exposed it is not clear what their readiness state was. All of these are liquid fueled if you fuel them and don't use them before the time expires there is a several day recycle time. If its a preemptive US attack probably 10-12 get launched with maybe a 20-25% dud rate so 8-10 3MT+ explosions. Certainly NYC, Washington DC, LA and Chicago are targeted. Probably also Detroit, Pittsburgh, Vandenberg (one of our main missile sites). After that it starts to be a wild guess with anything strategic and military in nature being high on the list industrial stuff a very close second. If the Soviets shoot first its 42+ warheads again assuming a 20-25% failure rate that's ~32 large detonations. 

The bomber force is mostly TU-95 Bears and M-4 Bisons (the latter notoriously short ranged). There were also Il-28 Beagle medium range bombers in Cuba though whether or how many free fall atomic weapons existed on the island at that time is unclear at best. NORAD at that point was heavily equipped with various Century series interceptors armed with Falcon guided missiles as well as the notorious nuclear tipped Genie rocket. In addition there were many batteries of Nike Zeus surface to air missiles protecting large cities and some bases. The NOB author thinks the odds of any of these getting through is slim and I think he is if anything overestimating their odds. This is a suicide run with very little chance of any success at all.

Finally there were Soviet sub launched missile (cruise, and ballistic).  These have VERY short ranges (100-400 NM) and must surface to launch and launching takes time. There are about 95 total of these on various platforms. Call it 100, I think maybe 10% of the missiles get off. Using my usual 20-25% failure rate that's another 8 coastal strikes. 

I suspect the US gets hit and ~40 nuclear detonations is a very bad day. Deaths will be in the millions likely 10's of millions. In some areas transport will cease as well as major services. The Florida of Pat Frank's Alas Babylon is probably on the right order of magnitude for some regions especially coastal ones with large cities and critical strategic targets. At the low end the US walks away staggering, on the high end it is teetering on a razors edge of collapse. Where the damage is is dependent on what gets launched and what detonates, there will be some serious randomness to it and some targets (NYC, Washington DC) likely have multiple weapons targeted to deal with that even given the paucity of weapons. NATO countries particularly the UK and Turkey are hit hard due to their hosting IRBM and SLBM sub basing (UK) and the Soviets likely using their short and intermediate range hardware against those in a use it or lose it response.  Most NATO bases that host US nuclear weapons would be targeted these are all over Europe. I think the UK is in bad shape, Turkey it is hard to tell. Other European countries (e.g. Belgium, France, perhaps  West Germany (BDR) ) are likely to be targeted as well as US bases in Japan and probably the Philippines. The latter two being islands seem likely targets for the short ranged Soviet SLBM and cruise missiles. Although the JDF naval forces might just surprise the soviet subs.

The reverse is a very different matter. The US still holds a massive superiority in strategic weapons due to that being our primary response to anything larger than a pack of Pioneer Youth crossing into the BDR. Looking to the NOB referenced earlier we have this 229 ICBM (Atlas and Titan), 144 SLBM (Polaris), 105 MRBM (Primarily Thor) and 1300 Strategic Bombers (B52, B58, some B47 and likely even a few B50). Oh and the UK has some of their V bombers armed with thermonuclear weapons and they have made it clear they will be targeting cities not military targets, Now probably only half of the US bomber force was actually useful and who knows if there were enough free fall weapons to arm them all. I think my 80% rate is good guess for the ICBM. The warheads for the Polaris had an issue (although one had been full up tested in the Frigate Bird shot and that had yielded nominally though the Circular Error Probable (CEP) was huge) so maybe 30% full yield and another 10-20 percent low kiloton fizzles, rest out and out duds. Given the poor CEP (miles) on the Frigate Bird test we can ignore those fizzles at least as militarily insignificant. Finally the Bombers. Period surface to Air missiles as well as the PVO are an issue. But with several hundred attackers some are going to get through, The UK V bombers just add to the confusion, not sure how big that force was in 1962, probably 100 tops. So maybe 10% of each force drop their weapons that's 70 weapons give or take. So recapping using my failure estimates that's 183 strikes from ICBM, 43 full SLBM strikes, plus ~70 free fall weapon strikes. That's 296 strikes most in the Megaton+ range in the Soviet Union. 

The precis on the SIOP63 made it clear that one concern of the new plan was to minimize or avoid collateral damage to our allies and to limit damage to targets that were not of a military nature. As noted earlier I have NOT found the declassified SIOP63 so the strategic goals as seen by that period are not available to me. However, I can speculate. You don;t have to be an idiot to figure out that the unstoppable ICBM are likely to be used to attack other ICBM sites in the hope that those weapons are still being readied. It is not clear how effective that would have been. The US was at DEFCON 2, just a step away from a full shooting war. In addition the Commander in Chief for SAC had sent that notification (and his notice effectively a war warning) in the CLEAR (cf NOB) so the Soviets would know as a warning. I would expect the Soviets were at their highest alert. about 2/3 of their missiles were in hardened sites with 15-20 minute normal response times. The soft sites had a run up of ~3hrs, they could hold at that for some period (24-36 Hrs?) but once done would need some refit before being ready again. Not sure you catch many on the ground, but every one you catch is one city or base that makes it to tomorrow. It's a gamble I think the politicians and generals would be willing to make. Another thing the early strike weapons will be used for is to clear the way for the bombers. If that wave can reduce PVO and SAM sites the yield of the bomber wave can be improved to perhaps a 30% success rate. You now get 200+ delivered weapons from it instead of 70. Lastly command and communication will be targeted. In a world where 30-45 minutes is all you've got adding 10-15 minutes of confusion (especially in a system that is rigidly top down) may make a large difference. I believe Warsaw Pact nations would be hit with "tactical" weapons on medium bombers as well as fighters. Also short range SRBM like Corporal and Honest John are likely to be used to attack air bases, again to help the bomber wave.

My opinion is that the Soviet Union would cease to exist as a functional nation. Allegedly it has a population of 209 million people by their own 1959 census. That seems somewhere between unlikely and ludicrous as US Census of 1960 yields a US population of 179 million.  The Soviet Union took massive loss of the males of reproduction age population in WWII. Other numbers put the USSR at 120 Million which still seems high. Their densest populations are around cities as they were struggling to industrialize coming into WWII and then throughout the Cold War to compete with the US. Those dense populations are going to take a big hit as is the rail and road infrastructure needed to move things around. The initial strike probably kills 10-50 million. Afterward there will be famine in all but the most rural sections (and likely even there to some degree). If the land mass of the USSR has a population of 25 Million by the end of this I would be deeply surprised.

Generally I think the US fairs somewhat better than many thought it would at the time. That is NOT to say its in any way good. A large portion of Americas industrial might is gone, and it probably can no longer project power past its borders. It has lost 10-30% of its population. Europe is probably a wasteland with large losses due to starvation over time. The Soviet Union is a hellscape near its cities and rather unpleasant anywhere downwind of them or military installations. No one is coming to help, and some (Red China?) may be coming to pick the bones. I would not be writing to you as I was a 18 month old down wind of NYC and near the Groton Sub Base. In this case we really avoided a catastrophe by the skin of our teeth

Tregonsee (L2) signing out for now

Counterfactual Part 2: USSR/USA war in Korean War Period (1950-1951)

 So this is part 2 of the post of a short while back. The questions were 

1. What might have combat in Europe at this time(Korean War) looked like?
2. If the war escalates to nuclear exchanges what are we looking at

Here we already have a fairly full on confrontation going on on the Korean Peninsula. North Korea (and Communist China) are at this point both direct clients of the USSR. That combat certainly gives an idea what fighting in Europe might look like as the North Korean weapons and doctrine are pure Soviet in nature. The NSC-68 report foresaw a rapid advance of the USSR across continental Europe. The information here US Army Between World War II and the Korean War suggests only 1 active division in Europe with a total of only 10 active divisions. There was also a general paucity of materiel of all sorts (weapons, ammunition, rations, uniforms etc) that would have greatly impeded any response, just as it did in Korea. NSC-68 suggests there were 26 Soviet divisions in Eastern Europe although the Rand Paper questions how many of those were other than paper divisions and also questions whether there would have been issues with at least low level rebellion. It looks to me like the USSR has the upper hand here but I suspect it is a far harder task than the NSC-68 report suggests.

Nuclear combat is a totally different issue. The USSR at this point literally can not strike the continental US other than at a few points and there only with suicide runs. The TU-4a (B-29 copies modified for nuclear delivery) are rare and of limited number and highly limited range. Europe and the UK they can reach although even mid 50's jets are a nightmare for B-29 class hardware as seen by the kind of havoc wreaked by Mig 15's against the B-29s in the Korean theater. The USSR may have up to 50 RDS-1 weapons (Their implosion based weapon similar to the production US MK-3 ) but having them and being able to use them are two different things. One might also see weapons used against US bases in Japan.

 The US isn't much better off. The weapon has improved with the MK4 which does not need as much hand assembly as the MK3 did, but still needs some work to be operational. I have a lovely document Ramey AFB conference April 1950 that has what appear to be a briefing on the war plans (declassified of course). Interesting things to note:

• SAC had 27 B-36 long range bombers at this point (see Chart after page 2). Nuclear capable B-50 (uprated B-29) and B-29 at this time of the latter only 50% are nuclear capable
  
• There was an exercise "Dualism" (page 3) war gamed out. There were 6 A Bomb assembly teams available to be moved, plan was 5 to European theater, 1 to Alaska. Chart between pages 3 and 4 has detailed movements of teams and aircraft groups. This was to occur 3 days after things are set in motion
• There were 123 targets selected. About half were well understood The other half would need reconnaissance before the strike. 
• First strikes were planned 6 days after the order was given, numbering about 26, this uses 10 of the B-36 and over 100 B-29/B-50 based out of the UK. This is not a time on target set of strikes, the attacks have a maximum of 4 hours between them. Also only 1 bomber in each strike carries a nuclear weapon. Other aircraft are for support (i.e. decoys).
  
• Further strikes would be delivered in another 3 days with all strikes completed by 30 days from initial orders.
• Nuclear bombing accuracy from high altitude accuracy was initially poor. In testing SAC's achieved Circular Error Probable was ~5000 feet. That's basically a circle a mile across. They fought the CEP down to ~1800 feet, but that's still a large area. It will kill soft targets, but protected targets may survive.
  
• There's a section on issues near the end of the briefing. At the time of the briefing there were a whole bunch of issues. Effectively only 3 airstrips in the UK had all the desired hardware and runways long enough. Fighter escort is a big issue. Also the bombers in question have lots of technical issues. It is NOT the SAC we thought of in the 60's and 70's
  

How many of these bombs would reach their target? Presuming the Soviet PVO is not a total catastrophe (not a given mind you) if the targets are at all defended things will get ugly quickly for the US bombers. This is also a MUCH longer nuclear combat than those of us raised in the missile age are used to thinking of. The bulk of the strikes take 6-9 days to happen and there is a lot of wind up. The whole thing might go on for 30 days.

Best guess 10-30 strikes finally occur in the USSR. The UK gets attacked hard to try to stop the additional attacks. Maybe 5-10 weapons are delivered in the UK aimed at the bases used. Other targets in Europe might be hit if US was basing out of there, or maybe just out of sheer nastiness. This doesn't feel like an end of the world scenario, but as the old saw goes one nuclear bomb will ruin your whole day. USSR is probably done with for a while, UK is hurting badly, Continental US is unaffected unless suicide attacks are made from Soviet Far east against NW US (Seattle) or nearby Canadian cities like Vancouver. These are 20-35 Kiloton weapons very similar to that used at Nagasaki or the Trinity test. If you're not within a few miles of the hypocenter of the blast you are relatively unaffected. How affected the USSR is depends on which targets get hit and how much their infrastructure is damaged

Tregonsee (L2) signing out for now

 

Counterfactual/ Alt History: Could the U.S.S.R have successfully attacked the NATO/U.S.A. in the Cold War?

This post why does the dumpster always burn when I am away from keyboard on According to Hoyt contains a statement referencing this tweet: Was the USSR always a Potemkin state? . This lead me to wonder, how hollow was the U.S.S.R. and how unready/unprepared was NATO? What would that (thankfully avoided) situation look like? There are really two scenarios that I think of 

1. A ground assault on the European members of NATO (mostly Germany moving into the Low Countries)
2. A Nuclear exchange stemming out of some other ongoing issue (e.g. Cuban Missile Crisis) 

There is SOME information, but not a lot easily found. It also has the issue that it has the biases of the time, for example early analyses tend to treat the Soviet forces as overwhelming, something even analyses of the 1970s and 1980s readily admit the earlier failings. References I have found so far include

• NSC-68 [1] - Was a top Secret Report (now obviously declassified) briefing the president on the threat of the Soviet Union from 1950
  
• National Security Document 20/4 [2]- Report by the National Security Council on U.S. Objectives With Respect to the USSR To Counter Soviet Threats to U.S. Security
• Assessing the Conventional Balance in Europe 1945-1975  [3]- A paper from the Rand institute published in 1989 as the USSR was falling apart
• FAS nuclear-notebook [4] Various Nuclear armament issues information including acknowledged/suspected nuclear stockpiles of the nuclear powers by year
• Timeline of the collapse of the Soviet Union [5]- A rough timeline of the fall of the USSR
• HQ USAREUR site ( From Wayback) [6]- Lots of documents and info from USAREUR (US Army Europe) including period Top Secret references to the US army in Berlin (declassified)
  
• Military history of the Soviet Union [7]- High level history of Soviet army from revolution to the fall at McGill university, looks to be rehash of Wikipedia
• Chapter 5 of Why Nonnuclear States Confront Nuclear Opponents by Paul C. Avey [8]- VERY nice book/mongraph with details from the period in chapter 5. 
• Wikipedia - List of nuclear weapons of the United States [9]-  Nice list of various wikipedia articles on US Bombs and warheads with dates and numbers (if known)
• Berlin Airlift History [10] - History  of the Berlin Airlift from office of the US State Dept historian.
  

Of course none of these sources are perfect. FAS is notoriously alarmist in their stance and does use published sources which are almost all from various state sources and are potentially suspect. Rand is US funded, and of course the NSC of 1950 was itself part of the US executive. In addition the Soviet/Russian side of things is scarcer than hens teeth and what little I do find is far lest trustworthy than the Western stuff.

Looking at history as it spread out there seem to be a variety of obvious periods/flashpoints 

1. Berlin Crisis/blockade 1948
2. Korean war 1950-1953
3. Bay of Pigs  (1961)
   
4. Cuban Missile Crisis 1962
   
5. Vietnam War era  ~1964-1975
   
6. Yom Kippur War 1973
7. Afghanistan invasion 1979
8. Evolving Detente (1981-1989)
9. Fall of the USSR/ First Iraq War
10. Recent tensions 

I'm going to look at the first one here and then add more blogs over time, I suspect 2 will be another post, 3-5 will be another section 6  its own (or maybe roll in with the earlier stuff?), 7&8 another and 9&10 their own 

So looking at the Berlin Crisis (generally not going to quote sources for general info look at the list above) I think likely if the USSR wanted it could have taken Berlin. The question is what purpose would that serve? I suppose they could head further west into the BDR but that is fraught with all sorts of issues. For example they're at the end of a LONG supply line, even 2 1/2 years from the end of WWII I suspect their economy is still recovering and certain items they were getting Lend Lease they are no longer receiving. Also there is a suggestion in this source [3] that although they had an on paper advantage in divisions many of those were VERY understrength and ill supplied[3]. On top of that best estimates were their effectiveness was about 30-40% of equivalent US divisions. Also traditionally defense gives a 2-1 to 3-1 advantage. And their conquests in Hungary, Poland, and Czechoslovakia might get restive. Last of all there is the nuclear elephant in the room. in 1948 Joe 1 is a year in the future the USSR has no nuclear weapons at all

That said everything everything is NOT rosy for the US/Nato. US Forces are VERY limited especially in Berlin. Also the US Armies  performance in the start of the Korean war hints that Soviet hardware ( T-34 etc) and tactics would provide problems for the US troops. 

The Nuclear front is also interesting. This source [8]  suggests there exist as many as 50 weapons in the US Nuclear arsenal. However these are All Mk3 [9] variants essentially a slightly modified version of the Fat Man weapon used at Nagasaki. These took a specialized 39  man team 2 days to assemble. They are also rather dangerous objects once assembled, with no safing and even without the threat of nuclear explosion they are several thousand pounds of delicate explosive. In addition the primary delivery system for these was still the modified B-29s of the 509th Composite Group (plane code name Silverplate). Their range is limited sources say ~2800 NM for standard B-29, and that seems reasonable for the Silverplate variants given Tinian to Hiroshima was ~2600nm round trip. The aircraft would have to be staged in Britain or Europe, The range is barely enough to get from Northern Great Britain to Moscow or Leningrad. 

The Soviet PVO (Air Self Defense forces) flew Yak-9 (high performance prop)  and Mig-9 (early jet) interceptors. Those might provide an issue particularly the Yak-9, like many early jets the Mig-9 is rather short ranged and limited in high altitude performance. In addition what kind of warning system the USSR had at that time is unclear. Later in the crisis the B-36 and the B-50 (uprated B-29) start to come online so the delivery at least will be easier range wise.  There is some suggestion in [8] that there was concern in the USSR over a possible nuclear response. Given the USSR was working on a MK-3 monkey copy (Joe-1) and B-29 copy (TU-4) and had the US/UK labs well penetrated I am a little surprised that held much fear for them given the limitations they likely understood. However, I suspect as was usual in the USSR the tight security on things such as Joe-1 (and their penetration of Los Alamos) would have meant this information would not have been widely known outside of the highest levels.

All in all I think what prevented this going hot was not necessarily the nuclear threat but the need for the USSR to recover from a long hard fought war and to consolidate its conquests in the area that would later become the Warsaw pact. I think the blockade is all they intended, using it as essentially a warning shot across the bow and perhaps to some degree a bluff. Combine this with how penetrated the U.S. and UK state departments were and it does give the USSR breathing time to get their nuclear assets online.

Tregonsee (L2) signing out for now